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~TATE)JEXT

OF FACTS
The statement of facts as set forth in the Brief of
Appellants is essential]~· correct. \\T e desire however to
enlarg-t• some upon it and call the attention of the Court
to these further matters.
The record i:-; undisputed, and in fact the bank rommissionPr himself testified, that the a111onnt of time and
enrrg-~· w·e<>:-;sary to he expended h~· the banking departSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ment in connection with supervision and examination of
banks is not determined by the size of the institution
nor the amount of assets which such banking institution
has, but that "it is the number of problems you find at
the particular date of entry.* * * * *" and that "it is
really the condition of the assets and loans rather than
the amount of the assets which determines the time
required to be spent in examination and supervision of
the banking institution." (R. 23)
The Court found as a fact "that there is no reasonable relationship between the amount assessed against
the corporation or any of its branches and the amount
of work actually performed or required to be performed
by the bank commissioner or the state banking department in the supervision and examination of the plaintiff
corporation and its branches." (R. 61)
Prior to the time of consolidation of the five banks
which now compose the five branches of the plaintiff
banking corporation, there was assessed against them
only the charges applicable separately to each of the
five separate banks. At that time there was no charge
comparable to the $1000.00 which was charged against
the Spanish Fork main office, based upon the aggregate
assets of all of the branches. In other words presently
and under the assessment which is complained of, each
individual bank was assessed upon its aggregate asset~
and then the Spanish For~ main office was again assessed in a lump sum upon the aggregate assets of all
those branches which had already been assessed. This
procedure was followed, and the banking departmf'nt
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attempts to justify it under the existing statutes, in
spite of the fact that since the consolidation of the five
banks into the one Commercial Bank of Utah the evidence
shows that after the examinations have been made of
each of the five branch offices, the entire work of
examiners is practically complete. There is no banking
business carried on and no deposits received in the main
office and no loans are made through the main office.
There is no credit examination there and there is merely
a consultation with the executive officers as to matters
of policies and the ehecking over of the bond account
which is held at the main office. (R. 40 & 41)
By the consolidation of the five banks to one, there
has been no change in the nature of the assets, except
that prior to the consolidation, the bond accounts were
kept separately at the various branches, whereas since
the consolidation the bond accounts are kept only at the
main office thereby making it necessary to have only
one place to check that account. (R. 42) The record
further shows that by reason of the consolidation the
time and effort necessary to make the examination of
the various banks, which now are branches, has been
reduced and the task made easier by reason of the
matters above set forth and because there is a· centralized policy and one consultation with the executive
officers in the head office which takes the plaee of con~ultations with five executive officers as independent
operating units; also hecause of the uniformity of credit
files and the available credit information as to security
values, water stoek and other securities which the exam-
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iners may have a question about, such information all
being available at the one office. (R. 43)
The Court accordingly found as a fact: "There is no
reasonable relationship between the amount assessed
for the examination and supervision of the various
branches of the plaintiff corporation and that assessed
for the examination and supervision of the main office
of the plaintiff when compared with the work involved
or time consumed in such an examination and supervision." (R.61)
By the provision of Section 7-1-11 which is under
attack in this action the maximum assessment permitted
to be charged a banking institution is $1500.00 based
upon a bank having aggregate assets of $15,000,000.00
or over-This, although there are banks in the state
which have assets in the neighborhood of $80,000,000.00
(R. 39). So that under the present statute a bank having
assets of $15,000,001.00 pays the same fee as a bank
having $80,000,000.00.
The salary of the bank commissioner is fixed hy
statute. (Sec. 87-1-8.10-Amendment by Laws of 1945).
The Bank examiners are paid fixed monthly salaries
(R. 52). So that the amount of such salaries of either
the commissioner or the examiners employed in his
department are not dependant upon the amount received
from the examination of a bank nor does the amount
assessed against any bank under Sec. 7-1-11, or any
other provision of the statutes in question, in any way
affect or change the amount of salary whirh the hank
commissioner or other employees of the banking depart4
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ment would receive for services rendered in connection
with the exmnination and supervision of the banking
institutions.
National banks doing a banking business in the state
of Utah are not required to pay the charges as set up in
Sec. 7-1-11 and Sec. 7-3-6, nor is there any other fee
paid by said banks to the State of Utah or the banking
department based on the aggregate assets of such banks.
The banking department however, through the State
Depository Board, does have jurisdiction over national
banks insofar as any such national banks are depositories of public funds. As depositories of public funds
the national banks are subject to examination by the
banking department and on at least one occasion the
present bank commissioner and his employees have
made an examination of a national bank in connection
with such capacity as a depository of public funds.
Such national banks when so examined, and though
subject to the supervision of the bank department-at
least in the capacity Inentioned-do not pay anything
for the examination made of them by the state banking
department and do not contribute any funds to the
financial institutions fund to assist in paying the cost
of operation of the state government or state banking
department. (R. 24 & 25 ). In other words monies paid
into the financial institutions fund and appropriated out
of said fund by the Legislature to the banking department may be, and in the past have heen, used by the
banking departlnent to pay the cost of supervision and
examination of national banking institutions which do
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not contribute to the fund. (R. 25)
The respondent corporation has always paid its
re'gular property taxes, income taxes and all other taxes
which have been legally assessed against it in addition
to and without regard to the charges assessed against it
under the provisions of Sec. 7-1-11 and Sec. 7-3-6 (R. 41).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
THE CHARGES ASSESSED AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF
AS A BANKING INSTITUTION UNDER THE PROVISIONS
OF SECTIONS 7-1-11 and 7-3-6, U. C. A. 1943, ARE IN
FACT AD VALOREM OR PROPERTY TAXES AND ARE
INVALID AS BEING IN CONTRAVENTION OF ARTICLE
XIII, SECTIONS 2, 3 and 11 and ARTICLE I, SECTION 24
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. SUCH STATUTES
DO NOT ESTABLISH A VALID OCCUPATION TAX OR
REGULATORY LICENSE TAX OR FEE.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE CHARGES ASSESSED AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF
AS A BANKING INSTITUTION UNDER THE PROVISIONS
OF SECTION 7-1-11 AND SECTION 7-3-6 ARE IN FACT AD
VALOREM OR PROPERTY TAXES AND ARE INVALID
AS BEING IN CONTRAVENTION OF ARTICLE XIII, SECTIONS 2, 3, AND 11, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. SUCH STATUTES DO NOT
ESTABLISH A VALID OCCUPATION TAX OR REGULATORY LICENSE TAX OR FEE.

While the Appellants have broken down their nrgnrnent into three parts set forth as their Statement of
Points and Argument, it seems to us that the questions
involved in the matter and as discussed hy the appellant:;
are so intPr-related that the~~ can ver~r propPrly be
()
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considered under one heading as above set forth. Hence,
under thi~ one heading we will endeavor to answer the
argu1nent~ of appellants and set forth the contentions
of the respondent.
As the appellants have admitted, the well recognized
rule is that as to whether or not a charge made by the
State is a direct property tax or a franchise, occupational
or license tax, depends not upon what the Legislature
or anyone else calls it, but upon the incidents of the
particular charge itself. We need only to look at the
statutes involved in this case and the procedures followed and the uses made and authorized to be made
of the charges collected to see that these charges which
were paid by the respondent under protest and concerning which respondent complains are in fact ad valorem
or property taxes.
It has been admitted from the outset that if the
eharges set up by said Sections are in fact property
taxes, then they are invalid as being lacking in uniformity.
Although the facts are of course somewhat different,
we have here essentially the same question of law as
was presented to this court in the case of Smith v. Carbon
County, 90 lTtah 560; 63 Pac. (2d) 259. That case involved the question as to the validity of the provisions
of Section 28-2-1 revised Statutes of Utah 1933, particularly as they provided for graduated fees to be paid
to the County Clerk for services in probate and guardianship proceedings based upon the values of the estates,
as fixed by the inventory. This court in considering the
question there involved stated that the fir~t thing to be

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

determined was as to whether or not the various amounts
innumerated in the graduated scale under the statute
constitute a fee or a tax. This court then said:
"The adjudiciated cases define the fee of an
officer as 'reward or compensation allowed by
law to an officer for specific services performed
by him in the discharge of official duties' 25 C.J.
1009, and cases cited in footnote."
The Court then went on to say:

"* * * * * *if the amount required to be paid
in a given case for filing an inventory and appraisement does not bear some reasonable relation to the extent and kind of services required
to be performed, the money so required to be
paid, no matter how it is characterized by the
Legislature, may not be said to be a fee."
In applying the facts in that case to the law, the
Court stated:
"Experience, however, teaches us that the
amount of service required in a probate proceeding of the clerk and Judge do not depend upon
the appraisal value of the estate being probated,
but rather upon such matters as the number of
heirs, legatees, or devisees, the number of creditors, the character of the property being probated,
number of sales of property sought in probate
proceedings, etc."
To point out the similarity between the Smith v.
Carbon County case and the present case, we call attention to the fact that by the stipulation entered into and
by the testimony of the witnesses it is undisputed that
the amount of service and supervision required to be
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given to a banking institution by the banking commission
or banking department through examinations and otherwise is not dependent upon the amount of the aggregate
assets of the bank, but rather upon the nature and condition of the loans and other assets and accounts and upon
numerous other variable factors such as the general
economic condition of the area served by the institution,
percent of total assets to cash and balances with other
banks, U. S. Government assets, total capital accounts,
percentage of total loans classified by the examiner as
being past due, sub-standard, doubtful, or immediate
loss; the type, size and number of loans made, and
various other factors. (R. 23, 60, 63-64).
In the Smith 1). Carbon County case in commenting
upon the argument that the graduated rate of fee was
justifiable because the extent of responsibility assumed
by the clerk and Judge becomes greater as the value of
the· estate increased, the court pointed out that such
argument had no validity in fact. It stated that neither
the Judge nor the clerk was charged with the actual
management, custody or control of the property of the
estate. In the case at bar, the banking department and
the bank examiners are not charged with the actual
management, custody or control of the property or assets
of the bank. The court in the Smith case stated that the
responsibilities of the clerk and the .Judge were not
enhanced because the value of the estate was of greater
value, and that the Judge and the Clerk are each paid
a fixed salary the amount of ·which is not dependent
upon the size of the estate probated in the court in which
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they are officers. The analogy is clear as to this case.
The bank commissioner and the bank examiners are
paid a fixed salary and the amount of such salary is in
no way dependent upon the size of the banking institution
which they may examine nor upon the amount of the
charges paid by such banking institution. Whether the
banking examiners are assigned to duties in examining
a bank with assets of $100,000.00 or a bank with assets
of $80,000,000.00 during a particular month, the salary
and compensation of such bank examiner, and for that
matter the bank commissioner, continues on exactly the
same basis.
After considering the facts as above discussed in
the case of Smith v. Carbon County, this court then
concluded:
"What we do hold is that the amount of
fees that may be exacted must bear some reasonable relation to the extent and nature of the
services rendered. Otherwise, such fees are, in
contemplation of law, taxes. That being taxes,
they must be uniform* * * * * "
The court then held that the fees and the schedule
of fees was invalid because it was in conflict with the
constitutional provisions relied upon by the plaintiff,
which provisions were the identical ones relied upon hy
respondents in this case insofar as the question of
uniformity is concerned.
In addition to the various matters disrn;-:srd 1))' the
Court in the case of Smith v. Carbon Co11ufy n"ferred to
above to be considered in determining ·whether or not a
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charge set up by statute is a property tax or a fee of
some other kind, the courts have referred to other matters to be considered. One of the things which the courts
have looked to and upon which they have placed emphasis
is the question as to what is permitted to be done with
the monies after they have been collected; and in any
case where monies so collected are permitted to be or
may be used for general public purposes, or for purposes
of a public nature, then it has been held that the charges
80 made are taxes rather than fees.
In State ex rel Davidson v. Gorman (Minn) 41 NW
948 the court pointed out that since the statute there in
question required the money to remain in the treasury
as part of the general county funds, to be used in paying
the salary of probate judges, it was evident that the
purpose for which the statutory exactions were required
was public in nature, and consequently indicated that
t'luch exactions were in the nature of taxes.
In State ex rel Sanderson v. Mann (Wise) 45 NW
526, 46 NW 51, in holding that the charges exacted by a
Wisconsin statute as a condition precedent to the filing'
of an executor"s or administrator's account could not be
sustained as probate fees, but were in reality taxes, the
eourt said:
"The law nowhere prescribes the object or
use to which the money so paid is to be applied.
There seems to be nothing to prevent its being
expended for any legitimate county purposes or
public improvement."
It will, of course, he observed that frmn the beginll
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ning and throughout the history of the statutes relating
to banks and financial institutions (as will be more fully
discussed hereinafter) and particularly as relates to the
collection from such institutions of charges referred to as
being in the nature of charges for examination and supervision of such institutions, such charges have always
been directed to be paid into the state treasury to be
credited to the general fund. This was unconditionally
so until the enactment of Section 7-1-11 X, U.C.A. 1943,
which in its present form as amended by the Laws of
1941, First Special Session, Chapter 3 read as follows:
"All fees accruing to the banking department
as hereinbefore provided in this act shall be paid
by the bank commissioner into the state treasurer
monthly, and shall constitute a separate and distinct fund, which shall be known as the financial
institution fund. All expenses incurred and all
compensation paid by the department in the
administration of this act shall be paid out of
the financial institutions fund upon order of the
commission on vouchers approved by the state
auditor. No part of such fund shall revert to the
general fund of the state at the close of an~·
fiscal year until such fund shall amount to $25,000
in which event any amount in such fund in exee:-;:-;
of $25,000 shall revert to the general fund at the
end of each fiscal year."
It will be observed that under the present act it
IH provided that after the fund reaches the amount of
$25,000.00 the excess shall spill over into the general
fund at the end of each fiscal year. \Vhile the appellant~
have laid smne stress upon the fad that only on mw
12
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occasion has there eYer been a tilne when the spill over
did in fact go into the general fund, it is significant to
note that such fund did carry substantial balances in
excess of $~5,000.00 at the end of each of the fiscal years
1947, El-!S, 1949 and 1950 (Exhibit 3, R. 13), which
overages under the provisions of the statute should have
reverted to the general fund. The fact that they were
not in fact transferred to the general fund is of no
significance. The important thing is that under the law
such overages are not only permitted to but are required
to revert to the general fund for general public purposes.
It is not what actually is done, but what a statute permits
and contemplates that determines the nature of such
statute and the nature of any funds referred to in such a
statute. Even with regard to the funds from the financial
institutions fund which are not spilled over and paid
into the general fund, but which under the terms of
Section 7-1-11 X are appropriated by the Legislature
from the financial institutions fund to pay the expenses
of the banking department, the record clearly shows that
the use of such funds is not limited to payment for supervision and examination of the institutions which pay
the money into the fund. All of the expenses of the
banking department are paid out of such fund. The
hanking department is operated for a public purpose
and for the public good, and it has numerous public
duties which it perfonns outside and beyond the scope
of examinations and supervision of the financial institutions who pay into the fund under the provisions of
Nrrtions 7-1-11 and 7-3-6. One example of such puhlie
]

')

,)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

duties is in connection with the bank commissioner serving as a member of the State Depository Board. In this
capacity the banking department through the bank commissioner keeps a check upon all banks or financial institutions wherein public funds are deposited and whenever
necessary makes an examination of any such institutions
to determine whether or not they are sound and whether
or not they are complying with the State Depository Act.
Many of these public depositories are national banks
which do not pay any fees into the state treasury to
become a part of the so-called financial institutions fund.
The expenses for operation of the State Depository
Board as referred to in Section 74-1-8, U.C.A. 1943
have always been paid out of the appropriation made
through the banking department for its operations.
We believe no one would seriously deny that the
functions of the banking department are of a publir
nature and for the benefit of the public generally and
that the expenditure of the funds paid into the financial
institutions fund by the respondent banking institution
and other banking institutions constitute expenditures
for general public purposes. In other words, the funds
obtained from the charges set up by Sections 7-1-11
and 7-3-6 are collected for and expended for general
public purposes and as such are property taxes.
As was pointed out in the Statement of Facts herein
above set forth, the record shows clearly that by the
consolidation of the five banks which are the branch
banks of the respondent corporation and which previously were operated as separate independent hank,,

14
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the work of exan1ination has become less burdensome
rather than more burdensmne. As the court properly
found there is no reasonable relationship whatsoever
between the amount of $1000.00 charged against the
so-called Spanish Fork main office and the amount of
work required to examine and supervise said main office.
As a n1atter of fact the record, as pointed out in the
Statement of Facts, clearly shows that there is practically no exa1nination or supervision required for the
main office. All of such work relates now as it did before
to the examination of and supervision of the various
branches. But this supervision and examination of the
various branches has been made easier by consolidating
numerous of the records in the main office where they
can be exa1nined simultaneously. Appellants in their
Brief contend that the provisions of the statutes in
question with regard to these fees do not violate the
uniformity of operations of laws requirement of the
constitution, they contending that these fees fall equally
upon all similarly situated. Under the undisputed facts
in this case such is not the case. It is shown clearly that
a bank with assets of $15,000,001.00 pays the same fee
as a bank with aggregate assets of $80,000,000.00 or more.
Because of the admitted lack of relationship between
the amount charged against the plaintiff banking institution and the costs of services rendered by the banking
departn1ent, the appellant§ have sought some theory
under which fees could be legally justified without regard
to any reasonable quid pro quo:
The main argument made hy appellant~ is that the
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charges assessed were occupation taxes or license fees
and as such were valid and not violative of any constitutional provisions by reason of Article XIII, Section 12
of the Utah Constitution wherein it is stated that nothing
in the constitution should prevent the Legislature from
providing a stamp tax or a tax based on income, occupation, licenses or franchises. A history of the banking
laws relating to these so-called fees effectively refutes
appellants argument.
The first statute setting up a Bank Commissioner
was contained in Chap. 25, Laws of 1911, wherein it was
provided that the Secretary of State would be ex-officio
bank commissioner. Under him there were to be appointed by the Governor, by advice and consent of the
Senate, one or more bank examiners whose duty would
be to examine into the affairs of every bank and loan,
trust or guaranty association, at least once in each year
and oftener if the Bank Commissioner should deem it
necessary. Sec. 5 of that act provided:
"One examination each year shall be designated as the annual examination and for each such
annual examination, the bank examined shall pay
to the examiner, to be deposited in the State
Treasury to the credit of the general fund, a
fee as follows:"
There follows a graduated fee of $25.00 on $100,000.00
up to $250.00 on assets of over $25,000,000.00. That
1911 law contained provisions allowing banks to be
incorporated under general corporation laws. There
were provisions concerning the amount of paid in capital
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and surplus that would be required of banks, but no
mention of any license or occupation fee.
By the Laws of 1913, Chapter 45, this bank law
was amended to set up a separate state banking department. Section 5 of t hapter 45 of the 1913 Laws, Page
;)~ provided:
1

"The Bank Commissioner or Examiner shall
visit and examine every bank other than savings
banks at least twice in each year and every savings bank at least once in each year."
Section 8 of the 1913 Act then provided :
"For each examination as provided by this
Act the bank examined shall pay the Commissioner or Examiner making the examination, to
be by the Conunissioner deposited with the State
Treasury to the credit of the general fund, a fee
as follows."
rhe fee then provided was graduated from $20.00 for
assets up to $100,000.00 and then on up to $200.00 for
assets up to $25,000,000.00 or more. The 1913 Law was
carried practically verbatum into the 1917 Compiled
Laws of Utah as Section 978, Section 978 being the same
as Section 8 of the 1913 Act.
Section 97;) of the 1917 Compiled Laws reads a~
follows:
"The bank commissioner or the examiner
~hall visit and examine every ~;a\'ing~ bank at
least once each year and every other bank, other
than savings banks and building and loan associations, at least twice in each year."
Then Nt>dion 97R of the 1917 Compiled Laws read:

17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"For each examination as provided by this
chapter, the bank examined shall pay the Commissioner or the Examiner making the examination, to be by the Commissioner deposited in the
State Treasury to the credit of the general fund,
a fee as follows:"
The fee then provided was graduated as above indicated.
Chapter 18, page 31 of the Laws of 1919, Amended
Section 978 C. L. 1917, and in addition to raising the
amount of the fees, added a new section reading:
"A fee of $20.00 per day for each day required to make the examination of building and
loan associations shall be charged, which shall
be turned into the State Treasury to the credit of
the general fund. The company so examined
shall also be required to pay the necessary travelling expenses of the bank commissioner or examiner to and from the place of examination."
Thus, in 1919, was added the provision not only charging building and loan associations the cost of examination, but also a provision for the paying of travelling
expenses.
The 1927 Legislature in Chapter 50, Section 7,
page 74, enacted a provision for examination of industrial loan companies. That Section provided:
"The bank commissioner personally or by
deputy may, at least once a year, for the purpose
of making full investigation into the condition
of such corporation, make an examination of
such corporation. He is authorized to collect from
such corporation for such services the sum of
$20.00 per day for each day actually spent in
such examination."
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Thus, it will be seen that when industrial loan companies
were added to the jurisdiction of the bank commissioner
a fee for serYires actually rendered to be paid for on a
per diem basis for the time actually spent was set upon
the statutes.
In the 1917 Compiled Laws, there were provisions
with respect to cooperative banks for personal credits.
These corporations have since had their name changed
to Credit Unions, but in 1917 Compiled Laws under
Section lOG-! a provision was made that they should be
subject to supervision of the bank commissioner and
that section also provided:
"The fee shall be $10.00 for each examination."
Thus, it will be seen that with credit unions the fee
originally set up for them was an examination fee and
not a license or privilege or occupation tax. The law
with respect to these credit unions or cooperative banks
was amended by Laws of 1929, Chapter 40, wherein
Section 1064 was reframed and it was provided that
these credit unions or cooperative banks would be subject to Section 971 to 978, Compiled Laws of Utah 1917,
and further "be subject to the supervision of the bank
commissioner in the manner and to the extent set forth
in said rhapter, provided that the fee shall be $1.25 for
each hour actually spent in such examination." Thus,
in 1929, the charges for examination of credit unions were
st>t on an hourly basis. Although these cooperative hanks
for personal credit have had their names rhanged to
Credit Unions, the fee is still based upon an hourly
19
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basis. Laws of 1945, Chapter 15, Section 7-7-26 as
amended, reads :
"All credit unions organized or doing business under the provisions of this chapter shall
pay to the bank commissioner of the State of
Utah for the cost of supervision and examination
of its corporations the sum of $2.00 per hour for
each examiner engaged in making an examination of such corporation for such period of time
as is necessarily consumed in the completing of
such examination and shall pay all necessary
travelling and hotel expenses."
The Laws of 1929, Chap. 95, also amended the
previous laws with respect to building and loan associations and provided that at least one examination should
be had each year for such building and loan associations
and oftener in the discretion of the bank commissioner.
That statute further provided:
"For each examiner employed a fee of $15.00
per day for each day required to make the examination of a building and loan association shall be
charged, which fee shall be turned into the State
Treasury to the credit of the general fund. The
company so examined shall also be required to
pay the necessary hotel and travelling expense~
of the bank commissioner or examiner to and
from the place of examination."
Thus it will be seen that fron1 the time the stat<>
banking department was set up and provisions made for
examinations, the charges assessed against the financial
institutions under the supervision of the banking departments were always ostensibly set up to reimburse tlw
20
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department, at least in part, for the cost of examinations
and supervision. Never were any of the charges made
as a license or occupation fee nor as a tax upon the
privilege of doing a banking business nor as a condition
precedent to doing of the banking business. Always the
intention indicated in the acts was that the fee should pay
or help pay for the cost of examination, although the
basis for charging the various institutions in most of
the statutes was highly questionable because of the lack
of uniformity even as between the various institutions
covered by such acts. In every such act, from the beginning, it was provided that the charges so made were to
he turned into the State Treasury to become a part of
the general fund.
It is significant to note that when the legislature
concluded to provide for a license or franchise tax upon
one of the institutions placed under the jurisdiction of
the banking department, it found no difficulty in clearly
setting up such a license or privilege tax. This was done
in connection with the law relating to small loan companies. Section 7-1-8 U.C.A 1943, provides that small
loan companies are under the supervision of the banking department and subject to examination and supervision by the bank commissioner. Section 7-1-11 contains
a provision with respect to charges to be paid by small
loan companies for examinations on the basis of $10.00
per day for each examiner, but aside from such payments required by Section 7-1-11, small loan businesses are required to take out and maintain on an
annual renPwal hasis, a licPnse to carry on and con:21
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duct a small loan business. For such license and the
privilege of doing a small loan business such licensee,
before it is authorized to conduct such business, must
pay a yearly license fee of $50.00 (Section 7-8-1 and
7-8-2 UCA 1943). It is provided that such license fee
shall be in addition to the payment required to be made
"for examination by the bank commissioner." Section
7-8-5 provided among other things, as to small loan
companies:
"The bank commissioner shall make an examination of the affairs, business, office and records
of each licensee at least once each year. The
actual cost of this examination shall be paid to
the bank commissioner by every licensee so examined, and the bank commissioner may maintain an
action for the recovery of such costs in any court
of competent jurisdiction."
The new small loans act passed by the legislature
in 1945 (Chapter 15A, Laws of 1945) prohibits anyone
from making small loans as therein referred to unle~s
they hold the prop~r license. Section 5 of said act
provides that
"Each license shall remain in full force and
effect until surrendered, revoked or suspended
as hereinafter provided. Every licensee shall,
on or before the lOth day of each Dec., pay to the
Commissioner the sum of $100.00 for each license
held by him as license fee for the succeeding
calendar year."
Section 8 of said act then provided that the commissioner
shall make a yearly examination of each licensee, the
actnol cost thereof to be paid by the licensee so e:nuJiined
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and that "the commissioner n1ay maintain an action for
the recovery of such costs in any court of competent
jurisdiction." Thus, we get a clear picture of the situation where the legislature has endeavored to provide
for the payment by the small loan companies of a fee
to cover costs of supervision and examination on the
one hand and for the setting up of a privilege or occupational or franchise tax on the other hand. A clear cut
distinction is made by the legislature between these
two charges.
In the second special session of 1933, the legislature
amended ~ertion 7-1-11 so that said statute provided:
''All financial institutions under supervision
of the state banking department of the State of
Utah shall pay to the bank commission of the
State of Utah, the fees for the cost of supervision
and examination according to the following schedule, to-wit:"
There followed a statement of graduated fees wherein
was provided, for banking institutions, upon assets of
$100,000.00 or less there would be required a fee of
$50.00 for each examination, but not to exceed $100.00
per annum. The fees were then graduated up to where
an institution having assets of over $15,000,000.00 would
he required to pay a fee of $750.00 for each examination
hut not to exceed $1,500.00 per annum. It was hut a
~hort step then to the amendment which was made hy
the 1935 laws which provided our present section 7-1-11
wherein the words with respect to each examination were
deleted and instead of saymg $50.00 per examination

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

but not more than $100 per year, it was merely provided
that they should pay "for the cost of supervision and
examination", $100 per year on $100,000 or less and then
graduated up to $1,500 per year where the assets were
over $15,000,000.
It is also interesting to note that in the 1935 Laws
no higher dassification was made than with respect to
$15,000,000 assets even though as far back as 1913 we
had had graduations with respect to these assets up to
$25,000,000. It is also interesting to note that in the
1935 amendment a separate schedule was set up for
building and loan corporations. Also in the 1935 laws
there was set up the provision still contained in Section
7-1-11 which, immediately following the s~hedule of fees
for ordinary banks, states that for the examination of
trust departments in banks an additional $25.00 per diem
shall be assessed for the chief examiner and $15.00 per
diem for an assistant examiner. This likewise indicates
that it was intended as payment for the cost of supervision and not in any manner a license, franchise or
occupation tax. It will also be noted that Section 7-1-11
still contains at the end of that section the provisions
that these fees are to be paid to the State Bank Commissioner semi-annually on the first day of July and
the 1st day of January each year; that foreign building
and loan associations doing business in the state shall
be assessed $15.00 per diem for each examiner; industria 1
loan corporations for each examiner $20.00 per diem:
small loan licensees for each examiner $10.00 per diem:
cooperative banking for each examiner $1.25 per honr.
24
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\Yith respect to small loan licensees, the later law of
19-15 would perhaps take precedence and with respect
to cooperative banks, which now carry the name Credit
Unions, the fee has been raised on them by the 1945 Act
to $2.00 per hour. It becomes apparent that in addition
to the lack of uniformity as to.the basis of taxes upon
property as between those institutions covered by Sections 7-1-11 and 7-3-6 and persons not covered by such
Sections, there is a complete lack of uniformity as to the
basis for the charges assessed even as between the
institutions covered by said sections. For example, we
observe that foreign building and loan corporations are
assessed on the basis of $15.00 per diem for each
examiner: industrial loan corporations on the basis of
$20.00 per diem for each examiner, small loan licensees
at $10.00 per diem for each examiner, cooperative banking at $1.25 per hour for each examiner. Where these
examinations are made by state employees on a fixed
salary, what justification can there be for charging on
a different per diem basis for the examiner dependent
upon the kind of institution he is examining~
It will also be noted that in Section 7-1-11, it is
provided that in addition to the fees scheduled in this
act, institutions under the supervision of the state banking department shall be charged necessary travelling
and hotel expenses. \Vith respect to hotel and travelling
expenses, the· progress of the law shows that originally
hotel and travelling expenses were not included, but
merely what was then called a fee for each examination.
Later, the charge for each examination had added to it
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necessary travelling expenses and finally there was the
charge for the examination, plus necessary travelling
expenses and hotel expenses.
It thus becomes very evident that throughout the
history of these statutes the legislature never intended
the charges required to be paid by these financial institutions to be a license or franchise or occupation tax
payable as a prerequisite to the doing of business (except
of course, in the case of small loan companies where the
franchise or license tax was expressly provided, in
addition to the other charges). It was always clearly
indicated that such charges were intended to reimburse
the department, at least in part, for the cost of supervision and examination. It is quite probable that many, if
not all of these statutes would, if attacked, have been held
invalid because there was no uniformity as to the charges
payable by the various institutions covered hy the acts.
However, the fact remains that the basis for making such
charges was clearly expressed by the legislature to he
in payment for such examination and supervision, and
not as occupation or privilege taxes.
The main case relied upon and referred to in appellants brief is the case of Salt Lake City r. Christensen,
:1-t- Ftah 38, 95 Pac. 523. That case involved a ~alt Lake
City ordinance which provided:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to
engage in or carry on the business specified
without first taking out or procuring the license
required by such business."
The license tax was based upon the value of goodf:
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held for sale and based upon that the 1nerchants had
to pay an annual license tax. The ordinance also provided
that it shall be unlawful for any merchant to commence
or carry on his business without first making a statement under oath of the cash value of his goods.
A person may exmnine the banking laws of the State
of Utah in vain in an attempt to find a provision for
licensing or any provision requiring the payment of a
fee as a condition precedent to engaging in the banking
business. The only example in any of the organizations
or institutions under the jurisdiction of the banking
department is the license fee ·requirement provided for
small loan business and no such a requirement is made
of any other institution, and small loan businesses have
to pay for examination and supervision in addition to
this franchise or license fee. It will be noted however,
that in every case where a question of an occupation
tax or license tax has been involved, a license tax or
orrupation tax has been set up as a condition precedent
to engaging in the business and a person who does not
pay the tax is not allowed to engage in such business.
Our Utah sales tax is one of the best examples of
a license or occupation tax particularly in the nature
of an excise tax and Section 80-15-3, U.C.A. 1943 provides "It shall be unlawful for any person required by
the provisions of this Act to engage in business within
this state after the effective date of this Act without
fhst having obtained an annual license therefor." Then
follows provisions as to the excise tax imposed and provisions for its collection and pa~·mPnt. The question
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might be asked in connection with banks under jurisdiction of the banking department, "What would happen
if a bank refused to pay the fee provided in Section
7-1-11 ~" There is no authority in the law for the bank
commissioner to suspend that bank's business or take
over and liquidate the bank if the bank is otherwise in
good sound condition. The law provides that this fee
shall be paid as a cost of the supervision and the only
answer that could be given in this respect is that as
with small loan companies, the bank commissioner could
perhaps sue to recover the fees, but the fees are not in
any respect made a condition precedent to engaging in
the business nor are they made a condition affecting
the continuance of the business nor allowing the bank
commissioner to take over or stop the bank from doing
business if such fee is not paid.
There is another section of the statute we have
attacked to which we need make reference, and that if'
Section 7-3-6, U.C.A., 1943. This section is the one that
specifically provides for branch banking and provides
that a bank must do business only at its banking house
provided that it may establish branches on certain
conditions. The conditions set up under which a bank
may establish a branch however, are not the payment
of these monies required for examination or supervision.
It is not based upon the paying of any license fee or
occupation tax, but in order for a bank to establish a
branch it must have at least $60,000.00 capital and in
order for it thereafter to establish an additional branch it
it must have an additional $60,000.00 capital. HPrP tlwn

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

is the only provision of the statute which sets up any
condition precedent with respect to the establishment
of any branch banking and it is a requirement in respect
to the capital to be employed in the banks and nothing
with respect to payment of any examination fees and
nothing that would in any way effect the business of
the bank as a condition which the bank must comply with
before engaging in such business. It is true that Section
7-3-6 has a filing fee set up, but that is a filing fee in
connection with the application, but not a question of
an occupation fee nor a prerequisite to doing business
nor is there any provision in that section or elsewhere
in the act with respect to prohibiting a bank from continuing branch banking business if it does not pay
the fees required by Section 7-1-11 provided it does
have the capital required by Section 7-3-6 or other
similar laws.
It will be interesting to examine the laws with
respect to the bank commissioner taking possession of.
any bank and liquidating the same or seeing that its
eapital, if impaired, is restored or other provisions
wherein the hank con1missioner is authorized to take
over a bank or to stop a bank from doing the business
it had theretofore done. In no such provision is there
an~· mention of a failure to pay the fees being a condition
upon which the hank comn1issioner could take over.
The hank commissioner could take over if the capital
is impaired; he n1ay take over if the bank refuses to
allow the books to be exainined; or he may take over if
the hank is not paying itR depositors a:r:d creditor~
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properly; but if a bank were properly being operated
and allowing the commissioner to make the examinations
and no questions of any kind were raised in any respect
other than a lack of paying the fees required by Section
7-1-11 there is no provision whereby the bank commissioner or anyone else could stop that bank from continuing its business. The bank commissioner, we think, under
the law would be entitled to collect the fees for such
supervision and examination by an action at law, but
such do not amount to and were never intended to be
an occupation or a privilege tax that would entitle him
to prohibit the bank from continuing in business.
The appellant quotes at page 15 of his Brief from an
Oklahoma and an Illinois case. From the latter, namely
Reif vs. Barrett, 188 N. E. 899, he quotes the following:
"The mission of a license tax, occupation tax or privilege
tax * * * is always to regulate a given business or to control the right to engage in a given occupation. It is imposed as a condition or as an element of the conditions uzJOJI
the right to exercise a given privilege." The quote goes
on to state that while the tax itself may not always be
the sole condition yet its payment is invariably made a
part or a factor in the conditions upon which a business
may be conducted. Such is not true with respect to the
laws under attack in this case. There is no condition
in any of the banking laws that are in any way referahlr
to the payment of the fee under Section 7-1-11. Again
o~ page 17 of Appellants Brief, still quoting from the
Reif case, it is stated that, ''A license in form may not
be issued to a tax-payer, but the pa~·nwnt of the tax is
:30
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the license under the authority to engage in such occupation." That is not the case under the law involved here.
Again that case goes on,-" The payment of the tax itself
is a condition precedent to the privilege of carrying on
a business or occupation. The payment of the tax is
made mandatory, by the act creating it, upon. the right
of the individual to follow the given occupation." That
is not so under the facts of this case.
Again in 33 Am. J urs., page 326, Sec. 3, Licenses,
as quoted on page 17 of Appellants Brief, in referring to
a license or a privilege tax the text states that even
though such tax may also be passed to raise revenue,
it is imposed upon the right to exercise a privilege and
its payinent is made a condition to the exercise or
continuance in the exercise of the privilege, business
or vocation involved. That also shows that the monies
required to be paid under Section 7-1-11 are not privilege or occupation taxes.
Furthermore, with regard to the contention that
the charges assessed constitute a valid occupation or
franchise tax, it should be pointed out that such is not
the case for the further reason, in addition to those set
forth above in this Brief, that the tax or franchise
tax, as they would call it, is not placed upon and does
not fall upon all persons engaged in a like occupation in
the State of Utah. As has been shown, national banks,
who are depositories of public funds, are under the
jurisdiction of the banking department through the State
Depository Board and the banking department has made
and makes examinations of such national banks to deter-
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mine whether or not they are proper public fund depositories, and yet such national banks, do not pay and are
not required to pay anything into the financial institutions fund and are not assessed under the provisions
of the statutes complained of.
Another basis upon which this law should be held
unconstitutional is the fact that even though there may
have been a proper classification at the time the Act
was passed in 1933 and 1935, events which have transpired since have caused the classification to become
entirely out of balance. At that time the highest classification contained in the law was a bank having asse~s
of $15,000,000.00 or over. It may be that at that time
there were not very many banks with assets very much
in excess of $15,000,000.00, but today there are banks
having assets totaling in excess of $80,000,000.00 and
for such banks having assets in excess of $80,000,000.00
and other banks with assets far in excess of what are
referred to in the classifications in the statute, the
classifications by virtue of inflationary tendencies and
by virtue of what has transpired since the passage of the
Act in 1933 and 1935, have resulted in placing the plaintiff in a category where it is discriminated against and
is not dealt with equally and fairly and is not given
equal protection of the laws. This result appears in
bold relief under the evidence in this case which shows
that for the year in question the plaintiff was assessed
hy and paid to the defendant bank commissioner under
the statutes in question the sum of $3450.00 on aggregate
assets of $11,800,000 while another state bank with aggre-
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gate assets of over $80,000,000 paid only a total of $1500
under the same statutes.
"\Y e believe it is clear from the facts as set forth
hereinabove and as shown by the record that the charge
made by the statutes under consideration here are not
valid either as a property tax or as an excise or franchise or occupation tax. They are not, in fact, valid
occupation or franchise taxes because they do not have
the necessary incidents of such taxes, namely, the payment of such charges are not made a prerequisite to
the doing of business. Even if it were otherwise apparent
that such charges were intended to be in the nature of
a franchise or occupation tax neverthless they would
not be valid as such occupational regulatory tax because
of the fact that undisputedly there is no reasonable
relationship between the regulatory services rendered
by the State of Utah and the amount charged to the banking institutions. In the case of Provo City v. Provo Meat
and Packing Co., -19 Ut. 528, 165 Pac. 477, this court
stated:
"The courts, we think, all hold that where
the purpose of the ordinance or statute is to
regulate, under the police power, the amount of
the license fee or tax must be reasonable, and may
not exceed the reasonable cost of preparing and
issuing the license and reasonable expenses of
inspection and supervision."
'11he charges exacted by the statutes in question are
not valid as fees, because in the language of this court in
Smith v. Carbon Co., the amount required to be paid
"doe~ not hear a reasonable relation to the expense and
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kind of services required to be performed," and hence
the money required to be paid may not be said to be
a valid fee.
In view of these conclusions it becomes obvious
that the charges required to be paid under the provisions
of Section 7-1-11 and 7-3-6 are in fact ad valorem or
property taxes based entirely upon the value of the
aggregate assets of the banking institutions charged
with payment of said monies. Being such property
taxes, they are invalid by reason of the fact that they
violate the uniformity provisions of the constitution.
Furthermore, since they are in fact ad valorem or property taxes they violate the provisions of A1:ticle 13,
Section 11 of the Constitution of Utah which section
requires that the State Tax Commission shall administer
and supervise the tax laws of the State, whereas under
the provisions of the banking laws these charges are
collected, administered and in every way supervised
by the banking department.
A further contention of the plaintiff and appellant
in the lower court was that Section 7-3-o was invalid
by reason of the fact that the Act upon which said
Section is based violated the provisions of Section 2:5
Article 6 of the Constitution of the State of Utah whieh
provides that :
"except general appropriations bills, and bills
for the codification and general revision of the
laws, no bill shall be passed containing more than
one subject, which shall be clearly expressed
in its title."
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The court below found that this provision of law was
not violated and the appellants have indicated that for
this reason they do not discuss the issue here. It is our
understanding, however, that constitutional questions
may be raised at any time and respondents have not
abandoned this contention. The Section in question was
enacted as Chapter 12, Laws of Utah 1937. The Act in
question was titled:
"An Act Amending Section 7-3-6, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, as Amended by Chapter 6,
Laws of Utah, 1933, and as Amended by a Bill
Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah,
1937, Known as Senate Bill No. 30, and Approved
on the 16th Day of February, 1937, Providing
for Establishment of Branching of Offices of
Banks Upon the Approval of the State Bank
Commissioner and Fixing the Penalty for Violation of the Provisions Hereof, and Repealing the
Bill So Enacted by the Legislature of the State
Of Utah, 1937, and Approved the 16th day of
February, 1937, Known as Senate Bill No. 30."
It will be observed that nowhere in the title of the
Art is any mention made that such Act imposes a property tax ·upon branch banks or upon any banking
institutions or otherwise nor is any franchise or license
tax nor even examination fee mentioned. No one hy
reading the title could know that any tax of any kind
was imposed by said Act. In State ex rel Nettleton 1:.
Case (vVash) 81 Pac. 554, it wa~ held that frmn a title
reading:
"An Act in relation to the fee~ of State and
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County Officers, witnesses, and jurors,"
it could "by no reasonable exercise of the imagination"
be inferred that the Act treated "of the subject of an ad
valorem charge or tax upon the property. of estates", and
that consequently the Act violated the constitutional
provisions as to the expression of the subject of a
statute in the title thereof.
In passing it might be observed that the bank commissioner recognized the lack of uniformity and the
inequities in the schedule of charges as set up by Sees.
7-1-11 and 7-3-6 and at his suggestion the 1951 Legislature amended these statutes completely revising and
changing said schedule of charges. (Chapters 10 & 12Laws of Utah, 1951)

CONCLUSION
The charges set up and assessed under the provisions of Section 7-1-11 and 7-3-6 have no reasonable
relation to the services performed or to be performed
by the banking department in connection with the supervision, regulation and examination of the institutions
from whom such charges are sought to be collected. The
charges referred to bear none of the incidents of an
occupation, franchise, or excise tax in order to make
them a valid regula tory tax. The charges assessed are
clearly ad valorem or property taxes based upon the
value of the property represented by the aggregate
assets of the banking institutions and hence are invalid
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as violative of the provision~ of Article XIII, Sections
2, 3 and 11 and Article I, Section 24 and Article VI,
Section 23 of the Constitution of Utah.
We submit that the decision of the lower court was
proper and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON
A. lT.

~liNER

Attorneys for Plantiff and
Respondent.
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